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Summary findings
Risk shifting and incomplete contracting lie at the heart  Consistent with theoretical predictions, they find that
of the agency relationship inherent in the procurement  the risk factors affecting the sales and purchase
and financing of large-scale projects such as power  agreements drive perceptions of market risk for Ras Gas
plants, oil and gas pipelines, and liquefied natural gas  bonds. In particular, Ras Gas yield spreads reflect the
(LNG) facilities. Resolving this agency problem is critical  market's risk assessment of Kepco. Other priced risks are
in structuring the nexus of long-term contracts-  energy price and foreign currency exposure (which
construction, operating, output sale, and financial  influence Ras Gas credit spreads through their impact on
contracts-commensurate  with the projects' underlying  Kepco), Korean economic variables, and spillovers from
technological and market organization.  turbulence in European and Latin American emerging
By investigating the Ras Gas bonds-the  largest and  debt markets.
most liquid global project bonds ever issued in an  The authors' analysis shows that the design of each
emerging market economy-Dailami  and Hauswald  contractual arrangement is not independent,  because risk
provide empirical evidence of the risk-shifting  factors relevant to one contract determine the price and
consequences of contractual  incompleteness.  risk premium of the other. Despite heavy capitalization
They relate the credit spreads of Ras Gas bonds to the  and partial guarantees by the parent companies of Ras
bond spreads of the Korea Electric Power Company  Gas, the off-take agreement essentially determines the
(Kepco), the major customer, in the context of a 25-year  riskiness of the bonds. Dailami and Hauswald interpret
supply agreement, the oil price index used to price the  this as evidence of the nexus-of-contracts view of the
LNG, emerging debt market returns,  and various  firm in the presence of contractual incompleteness:
systematic and unsystematic risk variables.  Investors bear all residual risks and price their financial
claims accordingly.
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Evidence from the Ras Gas Project
1.  Introduction
The presence of  risky debt  in  a firm's  capital  structure  is known to  lead to  ex post
conflicts of interests between the firm's  equity holders and bondholders.' Given eguity's convex
pay-off profile, firms that are managed in the interest of equity holders have an incentive to shift
risk to their bondholder. Excessive risk taking,  if not controlled through  contractual and pre-
commitment  devices,  could  result  in  suboptimal  investment  decisions  (over-  or  under-
investment). The associated investment distortions cause deadweight losses to the economy. The
risk  shifting incentives of risky debt and  the associated suboptimal  investment problem arise
from the interplay of pay-off profiles and informational asymmetries between equity holders and
bondholders, e.g., in circumstances where monitoring and contracting costs prevent bondholders
from sufficiently observing investment choices made by inside managers.
To address such agency problems, recent research has advanced a variety of incentive
compatible  solutions,  including  financial  contracting  (restrictive  bond  covenants,  and
convertibility clauses, Kahan and Yermack, 1998), project finance (Berkovitch and Kim, 1990),
tax policy (John, John and Senbet 1991), and reform of bankruptcy procedures (Schwartz, 1997).
Through or because of such devices, it is claimed, borrowers can credibly signal to lenders that
they choose efficient levels of risk. This strand of literature, however, neglects a further source of
risk shifting that has a direct incidence on debt finance: contractual  incompleteness. Thus, in
markets where transactions are characterized by a high  degree of uncertainty and relationship
specificity conditions, contracting parties often have to leave many contingencies and provisions
out of ex ante agreements, creating incomplete contracts. Prime examples of such transactions
are investments in large scale projects, i.e., power plants, oil and gas pipelines, and  lquified
natural gas (LNG) facilities.
In this paper, we analyze risk shifting as a consequence of contractual incompleteness 2
and relate its sources to the price of risky debt in the context of project finance. The project in
question is the Ras Laffan Natural Liquified Gas Company (Ras Gas), set up to extract, process
and sell liquefied natural gas from a field off the shore of Qatar. Ras Gas signed a 25 year supply
'See Jensen  and Meckling  (1976),  Myers  (1977),  Smith  and Warner  (1979),  John (1987),  Green  (1984).
2 The theoretical  underpinnings  of contractual  incompleteness  are well understood  in the literature  on contract  the-
ory, whether in its principal-agent  or transaction  cost setting. According  to the transaction-cost  approach,  contract
incompleteness  is attributed  to high transaction  costs of writing,  negotiating  of contracts,  and costs associated  with
monitoring  of contractual  performance.  (See, for instance,  Joskow  (1987, 1988),  Hart (1988),  and Aghion  and Bol-
ton (1992).4
contract to sell most of the output to the Korea Gas Corporation (Kogas) for re-sale to the Korea
Electric  Power Company (Kepco)  for  electricity generation 3. The contractual  incompleteness
primarily stems from the long-term sales contract, the absence of a spot market for liquefied
natural  gas, and the economics of LNG fired power plants. At the same time,  the incentive to
shift risk to investors arises from potential opportunistic behavior by the output buyers and the
specificity of the required investment in LNG infrastructure.
If investors are rational and markets reasonably efficient from an informational point of
view, any material  change affecting the buyer of  a project's  output should  immediately feed
through to the price of debt and equity. From an analytic perspective, the Ras Gas joint venture
offers the unique advantage of having two large global bond issues outstanding and only one
major off-taker, Kogas, on behalf of Kepco. Hence, any change affecting the prospects of Kepco
and, more largely, the electricity market in Korea should be reflected in the Ras Laffan bond
yields.  The  Asian  and  Russian  financial  crises just  provide  two  such  external  events  that
adversely affected investor expectations and, in case of the former, Kepco's  perceived ability to
honor the off-take agreement. Related events revolve around rating changes for Korea and Kepco
that permit the definition of further events, both negative ones (downgrades) and, more recently,
positive changes (upgrades). Finally, Kepco has both ADRs and global bonds outstanding whose
prices and yields provide valuable information about the market's  assessment of the company's
prospects.
Given the contractual arrangements in  the off-take agreement and bond covenant  that
creates a legal and economic link between the output purchase and debt contracts we formulate
several hypotheses regarding risk factors. Any risks that can not be explicitly addressed in the
nexus of contracts comprised of the off-take agreement and debt contract (covenant) is ultimately
borne by investors. 4 Having bond yields of both the seller and buyer of the output allows us to
investigate which risks are priced by bondholders and, hence, shifted to them. In particular, we
expect that any deterioration in the economic prospects of Kepco should increase the likelihood
of breach of contract. Ras Gas bondholders'  exposure to Kepco comprises several components:
exposure to  the Korean economy and  its  demand for energy (electricity, gas),  and corporate
exposure to Kepco proper in the form of operational, financial and regulatory risks. Since Kepco
yields  reflect  both  corporate  and  Korean  exposure  we  attempt  to  differentiate the  two  by
including a set of Korean control variables. Finally, both Ras Gas and Kepco bonds belong to the
emerging debt market  segment of global bond markets so are subject to  emerging market risk
and contagion (the spill-over effects from the Asian and Russian financial crises).
3The  parties later renegotiated the initial contract doubling its volume and dropping price guarantees for Ras Gas in
return for the significant economies of scale realized.
4 Contrary to a large company, projects such Ras Gas have only one cash flow stream from which all debt obliga-
tions are to be met and dividends paid to project sponsors. Construction, start-up and operational phase tend to be
clearly separated fitting the typical time structure of financial contracting models. Consequently, one can easily iso-
late the various risks and conflicts of interest involved and analyze their incidence on the financial and contractual
arrangements.  Furthermore,  output tends to be  sold to very few  customers and  often a  single off-taker.  Conse-
quently, investor and creditor concerns necessitate explicit links between capital structures and off-take agreements
creating a web of interwoven contracts. (For further discussion of project finance  see Kesinger, and Martin (1998),
and Finnerty (1996), Dailami and Leipziger (1998).5
Using a sample of daily data from January  1997 to March 2000 we find that  Ras Gas
yield spreads exhibit a very high degree of persistence. By far the most important explanatory
variable  for both  levels  and  changes in  credit  spreads is the  Kepco credit  spread: investors
rationally anticipate on the incidence of the off-taker's financial and economic condition on the
riskiness of their bond. However, we also find evidence for over-reaction: while Ras Gas spreads
widen with contemporeanous Kepco spread movements, they narrow in lagged ones. The price of
crude oil, which serves as a reference for LNG pricing, comes out largely insignificant: investors
seem to disregard commodity price risk.. While rising energy prices increase revenue and debt
service capacity it also raises the cost of electricity generation for Kepco leading to higher breach
of contract risk. Further investigation shows that the direct energy price impact on Ras Gas is
insignificant but  that the indirect impact via Kepco's  financial position is highly  significant:
revenue and off-taker quality  effects off-set each other but the indirect effect via Kepco yields
survives.
In terms  of Korean exposure  variables we  find evidence of Ras  Gas exposure  to  the
Korean currency both directly and indirectly through Kepco yields despite the fact that the off-
take agreement is USD based. Also, Ras Gas bond holders acquire significant Korea country risk
which, in light of the energy dependence of the Korean economy, makes sense. Finally, we find
significant evidence for "guilt by association" effects related to financial contagion. As returns in
European, Asian,  Middle  Eastern  and  Latin  American  emerging  debt  markets  fall  Ras  Gas
spreads are predicted to widen considerably. In particular, the impact of contemporaneous and
past  events in  European  emerging  debt markets  stands out.  This  responsiveness  reflects the
turmoil in global debt markets following the Russian financial crisis of summer and fall 1998
which heavily  affected other market segments.  Similarly, Ras Gas spreads exhibit a  delayed
reaction to Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American emerging debt markets with only a few
but highly significant lagged returns accounting for most of the explanatory power.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide background information
on the Ras Gas project and its web of inter-related contracts.  Section 3 describes the project-
specific sources of contractual incompleteness and risk factors. Section 4 contains a description
of our variables and how they are related to the various risk factors. In Section 5, we summarize
the results of our empirical analysis. Next,  we carry out a  decomposition of the risk factors'
direct and indirect effects. Section 7 concludes. We relegate all tables to the Appendix.
2.  Ras Gas: Project and Contract Design
The Ras Laffan Natural Liquified Gas Company Limited (Ras Gas) is a joint venture between the
Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (70%) and Mobil Corporation of the US (30%). Ras Gas
has the right to develop lOm tons of liquified natural gas (LNG) annually from Qatar's  North
Field, the world's largest unassociated natural gas field with about 380bn cubic feet of confirmed
recoverable reserves (about 9% of global gas reserves). To this end, Ras Gas has constructed a
5.2  MMTA  (metric  tons  per  annum)  liquification  facility  in  Ras  Laffan  consisting of  two6
identical LNG processing trains, offshore drilling platforms, storage facilities, pipelines and port
loading facilities. Construction was completed in  summer 1999 and  cost approximately  USD
3.4b including interest during the initial contract phase.
As is customary in such projects most of the output was sold through long-term supply
contracts  even  before  construction  started.  The  principal  off-taker,  Korea  Gas  Corporation
(Kogas), is a state-owned company whose shareholders include the Republic of Korea (50%),
Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco: 34.7%) and regional governments (15.3%). As such,
Kogas  shares its  credit  rating  with  the  sovereign rating  of  Korea  as  does  Kepco,  which  is
currently  being privatized.  Most  of  the  Ras  Gas  LNG bought  by  Kogas, who  has  a  legal
monopoly  of gas  sales and  purchases  in  Korea,  is currently re-sold  to  Kepco  for  electricity
generation. Kepco, in turn, is about to double its existing LNG powered electricity generation in
the next years which makes it Ras Gas' de facto  off-taker with only the balance going toward
residential and commercial gas supplies. Kogas-Kepco currently accounts for more than 75% of
the projects expected revenue.
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Exhibit 1. Ras Gas Project Participants
Taken together the two sales and purchase agreements (SPAs) with Kogas account for a
total  of 4.8 MMTA of LNG. Beginning in the last quarter of  1999 Kogas will receive LNG
shipments for 25 years on a take-or-pay basis. Under such an agreement the purchaser (Kogas on
behalf of Kepco) is obligated to pay for the gas whether or not they take delivery. Hence, Kogas
can make  a cash  payment  in  lieu of  delivery  which  are credited  against  charges for  future
deliveries. The off-take agreement effectively indexes LNG prices to world crude oil prices and
contains minimal off-take quantities. As part of the second off-take agreement, which doubled
the quantity of output sold and thus yielded significant economies of scale to Ras Gas, the initial
off-take agreement was significantly modified. In particular, the parties replace a price guarantee
(floor price for LNG) with a minimum off-take guarantee (minimum quantity to be purchased7
and its evolution over time). Exhibit 2 summarizes the final capital structure and construction
budget.
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Exhibit 2. Ras Gas Construction Budget and Capital Structure
The preceding discussion reveals that a project such as Ras Gas represents a nexus of
contracts contingent on each other. For instance, debt financing and take-off agreements are
intimately linked since the latter serves as security for the former. The corresponding financial
transactions reflect this reality. They attempt to find an optimal balance of the various parties'
rights and obligations and serve to distribute risks to the entities best suited to bear them. The
following figure summarizes the contractual arrangements and cash flow structure of the Ras Gas
project making the nexus of contracts transparent in terms of the precise cash flows mechanics.
In order to minimize moral hazard in payments Kogas will make payment for shipments directly
to an off-shore trust account whose administrator then services public and private debt and remits
the balance to Ras Gas for operational expenses and dividends.
Other  ~~~~~~~~Korea  Gas  Corp.  Cnest
Buyers  numer  Buyers
~xients  3  Payments  Paymentr
Royalties  and  Taxes'  Offshore  Account  Debt  Service'
5~~~~  .........  ....... [3.  r Dvi  n  , .14
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100%  1100%ll
LQGPC~~.  .........  ..........  -LMblQ  ||Bodler|Banks  |
70%30
Operating  CoSts 2
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Note:  Superscript  numbers  indicate  payment  order  of  priority.
Exibit 3. Ras Laffan Contract and Cash Flow Structure8
3.  Ras Gas, Kogas and Kepco: Contractual Incompleteness and Risk Shifting
A large scale project such as Ras Gas typically requires a huge up-front investments with
a high degree of asset and relationship specificity. By their very nature, the necessary physical
assets cannot readily be removed and utilized elsewhere. 5 As a result, there is a danger that the
company and its financial backers suffer opportunistic behavior such as unilateral renegotiation
of contracts or the redefinition of property rights.  In the absence of a well functioning legal
system that is willing to define and enforce property rights and contractual clauses the physical
assets - always subject to hold-up problems - are of limited value as security to investors. Hence,
while the debtholders are, in theory, secured the location of the assets in Qatar and the lack of
credible legal institutions (enforcement) renders them inadequate for creditor protection. Instead,
the off-take agreement with Kogas provides the only security.
However, the SPA suffers from contractual incompleteness that arises from the interplay
of the investment characteristics, Kogas-Kepco's use of the LNG, and certain peculiarities of the
world market for LNG. At the heart of the problem lies the non-existence of a spot market for
LNG due to the lack of transportation capacity. 6 Consequently, the parties ofien build dedicated
vessels for LNG transportation tied to a specific project 7 and, in order to protect the very specific
investments in physical infrastructure, sign long-term off-take agreements. Hence, most LNG is
sold through long-term supply contracts, which, in turn, severely hinder the emergence of spot
markets. In their absence, the most  important hold-up risk consists of breach of  contract or
unilateral  renegotation  by  Kogas, the  off-taker.  These risks  are  directly passed  through  to
debtholders: they are locked into the project and, hence, vulnerable to opportunistic and strategic
behavior  from  the  customer. Investors risk  being the  victims  of  what  has  been  called  the
obsolescent bargain should the Korean customers not honor the off-take agreement (Klein and
Roger 1994).
Kepco's  use of  LNG  fired power  stations  for peak  load generation exacerbates  the
contractual incompleteness in the off-take agreement. These plants are the marginal ones meant
to smooth out demand cycles and most likely to be shut down in case of weakening electricity
demand. While the Asian financial crisis does not seem to have significantly affected the overall
LNG market, electricity demand was significantly affected. In Korea, electricity demand, which
C  Contracting problems arising from relationship specificity, sunk costs, and the associated "hold-up" problem, were
first described in other areas of economics by Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), and Williamson (1979, 1983).
Three types of solutions have been proposed in the  literature that balance incentives for ex-ante  efficient invest-
ments and  ex-post trade efficient: (i) writing contracts with proper legal remedies in case of breach of  contract
(Shavell, (1980, 1984); Rogerson, (1984)), (ii) agreeing on a rule for the re-negotiation of contracts (Aghion, De-
watripont and Rey, 1994), and (iii) writing option contracts (Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995).
6 With the availability of LNG tankers not tied to specific projects the nascent LNG market for immediate delivery
is expected to develop into a full-fledged spot market over the next decade.
' Part of the off-take agreement with Kogas-Kepco stipulated the construction of landing, storage and regasification
facilities in Korea as well as 7 to 8 LNG tankers, two of which have already been built and two more to be com-
pleted each year between 2000 and 2002.9
had been growing by 10% annually during the previous decade, declined in 1998 by about 3.6%
and Kepco, using LNG fired power plants as peak load reserves, correspondingly reduced its
LNG purchases  from Kogas by as much as 22%. The much decreased demand  for LNG by
Kepco  explains  why  Kogas had  to  defer  about  10% of  its  1998 LNG  cargoes.  However,
electricity demand has recently picked up (8.1% increase in 1999) and while demand growth is
expected to fall short of initial forecasts Kepco still plans to add about 20,000 MW of generation
capacity including LNG fired power stations over the next years.
The  resulting  bilateral  monopoly  between  producer  and  customer  now  leads  to  an
interesting  contractual  dynamic  that  directly  impacts  the  financial  backers  of  the  project.
Investors, for instance, negotiating over the terms of the contract after an investment has already
been  made,  may  be  taken  advantage  of  since  there  is  no  other  use  for  their  investment.
Anticipating  such  a  scenario,  contracting  parties  are  hesitant  to  make  relationship-specific
investments  without  adequate  contractual  protection.  In  the  Ras  Gas  project,  signing  and
renegotiating  the  SPA with  Kogas provided  ex ante  security,  all other things  being equal.
However, the Asian financial crisis and ensuing recession in Korea forcefully brought out that
the parties to such a project can not anticipate on all possible contingencies. 8
At the same time, from the off-taker's  perspective, commitment to a long-term contract
such as a Sales and Purchase Agreement (SPA) poses the difficulty of not knowing at the time of
contracting the future value of the output, i.e., the availability of re-contracting and alternative
suppliers. She faces a loss in the real option value of its flexibility. Conversely, a project such as
Ras Gas faces the danger that their dominant buyer walks away from the contract as alternative
sources of supplies are more cheaply available elsewhere than through the SPA. Hence, the off-
taker has always an implicit real option through breach of contract. This scenario came about in
1998 when Kogas started to defer LNG cargoes as Kepco diminshed its purchases in response to
reduced  electricity  demand.  While  the  renegotiated  Ras  Gas-Kogas  SPA  included  deferral
options, meant to pre-empt breach of contract, the risks from their exercise is directly passed on
to investors and, especially bondholders, given the total lack of an LNG spot market.
Since the assets are highly relationship  specific through  the construction of dedicated
LNG terminals and storage facilities, the necessary project specific tanker fleet and the absence
of a  spot market,  long-term supply contracts such as the 25 year SPA between  Ras Gas and
Kogas seem to offer a remedy. However, as we have argued the remedy is far from perfect since
there always exists the threat of unilateral renegotiation or breach of contract. These incomplete
contract risks are passed on to debtholders who presumably price them into their investment
decision.  Economic circumstances may change  so that the  absence of enforceable,  complete
contracts means that investors have to reassess their initial financing decisions. Here, Ras Gas
affords the unique opportunity to  analyze the price (yield) evolution of its outstanding global
bonds to identify the sources of contractual incompleteness and how they shape project risk, a
topic to which we now turn.
8 In the absence  of sufficient  contractual  protections,  the outcome  is likely to be an inefficiently  low investment,
often referred to as the under-investment phenomenon (Hart and Moore, 1988).10
4.  Project Risk Factors and the Ras Gas Bonds
The two Ras Gas bond issues proved to be in very high demand. Despite increasing the issue
size, they sold out on the first offering day (December 16, 1996) and were twice over-subscribed.
The long bond due 2014 had  a total  size of USD 800m and  was priced  at an  issue yield of
8.2940% or 187.5 basis points above 15 year US Treasury bond yields (interpolated). Issued as
both  a  global and  144A (foreign) bond  it was  targeted at  institutional  investors  with  strong
international demand (20% international, 80% US based  investors). The bond trades actively
which permits us to use its spread over US Treasuries to gauge market perceptions of changes in
Ras Gas' prospects and, hence, its riskiness.
From an analytic perspective, Ras Gas offers the advantage of few, clearly identified risk
factors whose  effects  make  themselves  felt  through  the  nexus  of  contracts  underlying  the
company. The deeper root of Ras Gas very particular risk profile is the sales arrangement with
one dominant customer. Hence, we would expect that events affecting the economic prospects of
Korea, Kogas and Kepco should be reflected in Ras Gas bond yield spreads over US Treasuries.
In the sequel, we discuss several key risk variables that have a direct incidence on the project's
economic and financial success and, therefore, should determine the riskiness of Ras Gas bonds
in terms of yield spreads.
The first variable behind the postulated chain of contractual risks is the oil price, which
effectively determines the  price  for LNG  through  energy equivalent  conversions.  Electricity
generation from LNG becomes non-viable at an oil price in excess of USD 23.00. As a direct
consequence of the project's  nature and contract structure the oil price is one of the principal
state variables affecting Ras Gas. In the sequel, we will use the logarithm of the price of Brent
(BRENT) - one  of two commonly used  crude oil reference standards for LNG pricing 9 - to
analyze the incidence of world energy prices on the riskiness of Ras Gas.'° We also decompose
the BRENT variable into three bands (below USD 14, between USD 14 and 23, above USD 23)
based on the project's economics. S&P reckons that below USD 14 per barrel various guarantees
by  Mobil  will  have  to  be  used  to  insure  full  debt  service  coverage  while  above USD  23
electricity generation from LNG becomes uneconomical.
The contractual provisions of the off-take agreement permit us to separate demand from
price risk  because Kogas, by and  large, has  committed to  buying  a  fixed amount  of output
annually." Hence, demand risk essentially translates into breach of contract risk. As Kogas does
not have  any publicly  traded  global bonds  outstanding and  is reselling  most  of its  Ras Gas
purchases to Kepco, we take the yield spread of the Kepco 7.75% global bond maturing in April
2013  (KORELES)  over  10 year  US  Treasury yields  to  measure the  economic  and  financial
prospects of the LNG buyer as assessed by capital markets. The fortunes of Kepco and its bonds
9  Gas prices  turned out to be non-significant  which  is not really surprising  given  that about 0.12 metric  tons of LNG
are priced  as one barrel of crude oil.
'° Diagnostic  testing  reveals  that logarithms  offer superior  fit over levels  for several  of the independent  variables.
"  Kogas can vary gas shipments  by deferring about 5% per annum up to a total of 10% which must be paid for
within  5 years  whether  Kogas  accepts  delivery  or not.11
are closely tied the Korean economy so that we expect the bond yield to reflect both idiosyncratic
Kepco  factors (operational, regulatory and  financial risks) and  Korea country risk. However,
even if the Korean economy does not experience any difficulties and electricity demand is strong
Kepco might suffer operational or unrelated financial problems that might force it to breach the
off-take agreement with Kogas and, ultimately, Ras Gas.
Ras Gas' fortunes also depend on Korea's macroeconomic environment. Independent of
oil price fluctuations the economic situation of Korea might deteriorate to a point where LNG
sourced according to the contract becomes too expensive or is simply not needed as electricity
and gas demand slump, e.g., in a recession. This risk is all the more relevant that 40% of LNG
imports are primarily used for marginal (peak load) generation and that Kepco already reduced
its LNG purchases by 22% in response to weakened electricity demand after the Asian financial
crisis. Hence, a severe recession might cast serious doubts over Kogas-Kepco's ability to honor
the contractual commitments. In addition to KORELES, the spread of the Kepco global bond, we
include a second measures to analyze this effect: the logarithm of the Korea Composite Stock
Index (KOSPI). In a similar vein, we also use KEPCO, the logarithm of Kepco's stock price, as a
measure for Ras Gas' direct exposure to the Korean economy.
A further risk factor is the credit quality of the off-taker which, in Kogas' case, might
reflect  both  systematic  changes  in  the  Korean  macroeconomic  environment,  the  industry
structure (i.e., loss of gas monopoly, privatization) or purely idiosyncratic risks. However, Kogas
and Kepco share their credit ratings with the Republic of Korea, whose rating over the sample
period has varied from AA- to B+ back to BBB. How important the credit quality of the off-taker
is to debtholders can be seen from the fact that the Ras Gas bond convenants restrict additional
SPAs to buyers rated A or better." 2 We, therefore, construct a rating index (KRR) that reflects not
only the changes in S&P credit ratings but also their magnitude.
Exposure to  foreign currency risk  can drastically change the economic viability  of a
project, as evident from the South-East Asian experience. In Ras Gas' case, this risk appears to
be of relatively minor concern as all revenues and costs accrue in USD. However, by the very
nature of the off-take agreements, the customer still poses a very subtle and indirect currency
risk. Both Kogas and Kepco generate their revenue in local currency so that an adverse currency
movement (devaluation or depreciation of the Korean Won against the USD) might imperil their
ability to honor the SPA. The Asian financial crisis was a stark reminder of this fact: as the
Korean  Won depreciated against  the USD the  effective cost  of LNG to  Kogas  and  Kepco
doubled in local currency terms. Hence, exchange rate risk when borne by the off-taker has a
tendency to transform itself into a credit risk. To untangle the two effects, we include KRW, the
logarithm of the KRW-USD exchange rate, as an explanatory variable.
Finally, we need to  control for the effects of  financial contagion and  other "guilt by
association"  characteristics of  financial  markets.  Events  and  particularly  financial  crises  in
emerging economies have a tendency to affect other, seemingly unrelated countries through the
propagation of financial shocks via global capital markets. In the data these effects show up as
12 In spring 1997 Kogas, Kepco and Korea were still rated AA- satisfying the bond covenants for the second SPA.12
correlated shocks. In order to  better understand how these propagation mechanisms affect the
Ras Gas project and its  bond yields we use the JP  Morgan emerging market bond regional
indices, i.e., Asia, Middle East, Europe and Latin America. We summarize the direct and indirect
effects via Kepco credit spreads of the various variables on Ras Gas yield spreads and their first
differences in the following table:
Dependent Variable  Ras Gas Yield Spread  Changes in RG Spread
Effect  Direct  Indirect  Direct  Indirect
Variable  Description  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
RGS(- 1)  Lagged Ras Gas spread  persistent
BRENT  (Log) oil price  indeterm.  +  indeterm.  +
BRENT<14  (Log) oil price below USD 14  insign.  +  indeterm.  +
BRENT: 14-23  (Log) oil price: USD 14 to 23  indeterm.  +  +  +
BRENT>23  (Log) oil price above USD 23  indeterm.  +  indeterm.  +
KORELES  Kepco yield spread  +  +
KORELES(-I)  Lagged Kepco spread  insign.  persistent  persistent
KEPCO  (Log) Kepco stock price  insign.  - indeterm.
KRW  (Log) Korean Won FX rate  +  +  insign  +
KOSPI  (Log) Korea Stock Price Index  insign  insign
KR rating  Korean country rating index  +  +  insign.  +
ASIA  Emerging debt returns Asia
EUROPE  Emerging debt returns Europe
LAT  Emerging debt returns Latin Am.
MEA  Emerging debt returns Middle East
Exhibit 4. Explanatory Variables
S.  Empirical Analysis of Interacting Risks: Breach-of-Contract Factors
In the sequel, we investigate how risk factors are transmitted through  the nexus of contracts
represented by the take-off agreement and bond covenant to bondholders. Our analysis relies on
daily data covering the period from January  1997 to March 2000 that is drawn from various
sources, mainly Bloomberg, IDC and Baseline. Whenever we found missing observations we
cross checked the time series with other news sources and filled in the missing data or, if this was
not possible, deleted the observation. Depending on the included variables we have 725 to 750
observations before taking lags. Our dependent variable is the spread of the  17 year Ras Gas
bond' 3 yield  over  the  10 year US  Treasury yield. The  explanatory variables  are the  above
mentioned risk factors affecting the contractual relationships at the heart of the Ras Gas project.
'3 The bond is highly liquid and widely traded contrary to the 10 year one and, therefore, constitutes a much better
measure of investor and market assessment of the project's prospects.13
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Exhibit 5. Ras Gas bond spreads, KEPCO bond spreads and Oil Prices
As  the  preceding  plot  suggests the  data is  highly volatile.  Table  1 in  the  Appendix
contains  summary statistics  for the entire sample period that further highlight this point. The
correlation matrix indicates that some of the variables are highly collinear, a point which we will
address in our statistical specifications. The preceding diagram clearly indicates the two defining
events during the sample period: the Asian financial crisis that hit Korea in December 1997 and
the Russian financial crisis that shook emerging debt markets in August 1998. In the attempt to
uncover  the  complex  dynamics  underlying  the  time  series  in  Exhibit  5  and  explain  their
interactions from a nexus of contracts view of the firm, we estimate variants of the following
empirical relationship in the sequel:
RGS, = #o + lax,RGS,,  +ABRENT,  + 1 2I,KORELES,,
0SI!SL  Osls0!L
+* 3KEPCO, +/4 KR W, + 65KOSPI, +  / 6KRR,
+  [Y,-MEA,,  +Y2 ,ASIA,,  +73 ,EUR,,  +y4 ,LAT,  ,]+*
where  RGS,  is the spread of the Ras Gas bond over 10 year US Treasury yields, BRENT, the
logarithm of the Brent blend oil price index,  KORELES,  the spread of the 2013 7.75% Kepco
global bond over 10 year US Treasury yields,  KEPCO,  the logarithm of the Kepco stock price,14
KR W, the logarithm of the Korean Won - US Dollar spot rate, KOSPI,  the logarithm of the
Korea Composite Stock Price Index,  KRR, a credit rating index for Korea, Kepco and Kogas,
and  MEA,,ASIA,,EUR,,LAT,  the  continuously compounded  daily returns  of  the JP  Morgan
regional  total  return indices in  USD  for  emerging markets  in  the Middle  East-Africa, Asia,
Europe and Latin America, respectively.
In terms of estimation strategy, we start with the two key variables depicted in Exhibit 6,
the oil price and Kepco bond yield spreads, and successively add explanatory variables to the
regression equation estimated by OLS. First, we focus on the supply contract specific variables
of oil price and Kepco bond yield. Next, we will add contemporaneous and lagged emerging debt
market returns to analyze systematic effects such as spill-overs and contagion. We then include
variables related to Korean country risk before estimating models with all variable categories. It
turns  out  that  for  any  number  of  variables  and  their  lags  the  residuals  exhibit  high  serial
correlation. Adding a lagged dependent variable generally fixes this  problem as evidenced in
Table 2 (Durbin and Watson d statistic). Given the high frequency of the data, it comes at no that
daily credit spreads exhibit a very high degree of persistence: the coefficient on lagged spreads is
close to unity.
Tables 2 to  7 in the Appendix  report the best  fit estimation results  after specification
testing eliminated highly insignificant control variables. As we would expect, Ras Gas spreads
vary positively with Kepco credit spreads: the second specification in Table 2 indicates that a
100 basis point increase in Kepco spread widens the Ras Gas spread by about 2 basis points.
Hence, the perceived riskiness  of the off-taker  feeds through  immediately to  Ras  Gas  yield
spreads which is consistent with the nexus of contract view of the firm. In light of the contractual
incompleteness of the off-take agreement, credit migration by the dominant output buyer affects
market risk perceptions of the firm in terms of yield spreads: off-take risk is shifted from Ras
Gas owners to its bondholders as predicted by debt agency theories.
Including the lagged Kepco spread reveals that bondholders overreact to news about the
off-taker. Initially, Ras Gas spreads widen by 15.5 basis points for every 100 basis point increase
in Kepco spreads. However, the next day they narrow by  13.6 basis points (coefficient on the
lagged Kepco yield spread) all other things being equal. A comparison between the second and
third regressions reported in Table 2 shows the 2 basis points spread widening is the net reaction
over a two day period. Since further lags of the Kepco spread come out insignificant we interpret
the change of sign between the initial and lagged reaction as a sign of over-reaction: Ras Gas
bondholders over-react to news about the off-taker. The results in Table 2 show that this pattern
is  stable  across  all  specifications.  One  possible  explanation  for  the  market's  apparent
overreaction to changes in the off-taker's credit spread might lie in Kepco's importance for debt
service. Since most revenue comes from one single source, any deterioration in its prospects calls
into question the financial viability of Ras Gas.
Regarding  oil  prices  we  find  that  the  coefficient  is  marginally  significant  at  best.
Independent of the set of control variables energy prices do not seem to significantly determine
Ras Gas yield spread levels and, hence, the bond's  riskiness as priced in global markets. It is15
quite remarkable that markets seem to view the oil price as irrelevant because it determes the
output price and, ultimately, the revenue that Ras  Gas will generate from  LNG sales. In the
sequel we will further investigate this  puzzle by decomposing the impact of BRENT  into its
direct revenue and indirect credit migration effect via Kepco and looking at different oil price
bands.
Turning  to  the  impact  of  emerging  markets  on  Ras  Gas  credit  spreads we  include
contemporaneous  and  up  to  five  lags  of  daily  regional  emerging  debt  market  returns.
Successively  testing  for  their  statistical  significance  and  eliminating  the  most  insignificant
variables leads to the emerging market propagation pattern reported in specifications 4 and 5 of
Table 2. As one  would predict, Ras Gas spreads vary negatively with emerging debt market
returns.  The  remaining  significant lags  hint  at the  time  structure  of  the  shock propagation
mechanism behind this  contagion  effect.  While  Ras  Gas spreads  show  a  particularly  strong
contemporaneous reaction to European emerging debt markets (dominated by Eastern European
countries and Russia in particular) the other debt markets' impact is delayed. European and Latin
American  debt  returns  are  particularly  persistent:  3  and  5  days  later  they  have  their  most
significant effect.
Adding Korea specific variables (specifications 6 to 8 in Table 2) reveals that the Korean
rating  index KRR  is  insignificant  but  the  Kepco  price KEPCO  significant at the  1% level.
Concerning  exchange  rate  exposure  as  measured  by  the  exchange  rate  KRW  we  find  that
coefficient comes out negative. The negative association of Ras Gas spreads and the Korean Won
- US  Dollar exchange rate is puzzling: one would have expected that breach of contract and
default risk increases as the Won depreciates, i.e., KRW increases. Instead, a depreciation of the
Won seems to reduce Ras Gas credit spreads.
The last regression reported in Table 2 puts together the three components of Ras Gas
bond riskiness: variables representing contract risk, Korean exposure and emerging debt market
spill-over effects. The net impact of Kepco yields is still 2 to 3 basis points, the significant Korea
variables do not change in either identity or magnitude and the same is true for the emerging debt
market contagion structure.
Given the very high degree of persistence in Ras Gas yield spreads as evidenced by a
coefficient of about 0.98 we next look at the hypothesis that the spread might follow a random
walk by testing for unit roots. Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests show, that we
can not reject the hypothesis that Ras Gas spreads follow a random walk (see Table 3). The same
is true  for Kepco  spreads and  Brent  oil  prices. Similarly, we  can  not  decisively reject  co-
integration  between  Ras  Gas  spreads  and  Brent  or  Kepco  spreads  by  Engle-Granger  and
Augmented Engle-Granger tests (see Table 3). However, error correction models of the Ras Gas
credit spread do not perform well. Given that Kogas and Kepco buy 75% of Ras Gas output and
but that Ras Gas is only one among many suppliers to Kogas - Kepco (and the marginal at that)
the absence of a statistical equilibrium relationship comes as no surprise. Kepco influences Ras
Gas in equilibrium but not the reverse.16
Since we can not easily distinguish between persistence and unit root in the dependent
variable we replicate the preceding analysis for changes in Ras Gas credit spreads, i.e., taking
first differences of the dependent variable to address possible non-stationarities:
ARGS, =  /f0  + /A 1BRENT,  +  E  2,-_KORELES,_J
+ /J3KEPCO, + 84KRW, + / 5KOSPI, + ,/6AKRR,
+  X[Y1,,MEA,,I  + y 2,ASIA,,  + y 3 ,EUR,,  +y3  LAT,-,]+  ,
0￿￿SL
The results  in Table 4  and diagnostic  testing  reveal that  first differences  in  the independent
variables leads to inferior statistical performance so that we keep them in levels except for the
rating  variable KRR.  We also  experimented  with  using  Kepco  yields  rather  than  the  credit
spreads but the results are virtually identical. Table 4 reports the results for best fit regression
specifications. The results confirm our earlier findings from the level analysis that markets price
output buyer related risk factors and that, therefore, the project shifts risk to bondholders. With
spread changes as dependent variable, the oil price's logarithm becomes significant at the 10% or
5% level whereas the Won  exchange rate becomes insignificant.  The emerging  debt markets
contagion  patterns  are  very  similar  and  the  over-reaction  result  also  obtains:  again,  the
coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged Kepco spreads change in sign.
6.  Direct and Indirect Effects  of Risk Factors
To the extent that both Ras Gas and Kepco fall into the same emerging markets and energy bond
categories, we would expect that a common set of factors affect both their credit spreads. In order
to distinguish the direct, contract related effects from the indirect, common factor induced ones
we next specify a simultaneous equation model of the Ras Gas and Kepco yield spreads. We use
the contractual arrangements to derive restrictions on the system's parameters. Since the off-take
agreement effectively collateralizes the Ras Gas bonds, their credit spread critically depends on
the prospects of Kepco, the ultimate buyer of its LNG output. The reverse does not hold. Kepco
has a well diversified portfolio of fuel types and sources and, in any event, LNG is used for peak-
load electricity generation. In addition, we conjecture that the Korean control variables primarily
influence Ras  Gas bond yields  and  credit  spreads through  Kepco's  exposure  to  the Korean
economy: the Ras Gas' Korean exposure acts through Kepco.
We estimate the simultaneous equation  system by Maximum Likelihood methods. We
can then carry out diagnostic tests to determine which risk factors affect Ras Gas bonds directly
and which ones operate indirectly through their incidence on Kepco's financial health. Under the
restriction that  Kepco  spreads  influence Ras  Gas ones  but  not  the reverse  we  arrive at  the
following specification: 14
14 Ras  Gas spreads  in  the Kepco  equation  come out insignificant  as expected.17
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As the lagged Kepco spreads are insignificant in the Ras Gas spreads equation we drop
them in the sequel. Similarly, all emerging debt market returns are insignificant in the KORELES
equation as evidenced by the first simultaneous equation specification in Table 5. The results
show that the oil price impacts the  riskiness of  Ras Gas through  its effect  on the financial
position of Kepco rather than directly: while BRENT is insignificant in the RGS equation it is
highly significant in the KORELES equation. We interpret this outcome, which holds for the full
set of explanatory variables as well as sub-sets (see specification 3 and 4 in Table 5), as evidence
that investors discount the direct revenue effect of oil prices on Ras Gas. Instead, they are more
concerned about the impact of energy prices on Kepco's financial health. An increase in crude oil
prices by USD 2.72 translates into a widening of Kepco spreads by about 18 basis points so that
the indirect impact on Ras Gas credit spreads is about 0.66 basis points (systems 3 or 4 in Table
5). A comparison with equation 3 in Table 5, which also includes BRENT in the Ras Gas spread
equation, reveals that the direct effect on Ras Gas spreads is 0.24 basis points. However, it is so
highly insignificant that capital markets apparently disregard the oil price revenue effect in the
pricing of Ras Gas default risk.
In terms of the emerging markets shock propagation mechanism, the surviving significant
emerging debt market returns confirm our earlier lag structure. Europe and the Russian financial
crisis had the most lasting impact on investor perceptions. However, Kepco credit spreads seem
to  be  unaffected by  emerging  debt markets.  As  we conjectured, the  country  risk  variables
primarily affect Kepco's credit spread through their impact on Kepco's  economic and financial
fortunes. In terms of direct effects on Ras Gas, only Kepco's  share price KEPCO as an indicator
for Korea's  electricity demands together with the Won exchange rate come out significant. As
economic prospects improve so does the risk profile of Kepco as reflected in stock prices. Hence,
its yield spreads and, ultimately, Ras Gas credit spreads should decrease.
The second significant country risk variable is again the Korean Won - USD exchange
rate. Equation systems 3 or 4 reveal an interesting pattern: the RGS equation in each of the two
specifications confirms the  previously  identified puzzle  that  a  weakening  Won  on  average
directly decreases market risk perceptions as spreads decline. However, the indirect impact via
Kepco yields in the KORELES equation clearly exhibits the conjectured currency exposure effect
in terms of a positive KRW coefficient. As the Won depreciates Kepco yields rise as servicing
Kepco's foreign debt and its oil, coal and gas purchases all denominated in USD become more18
expensive. Consequently, Kepco's  financial position deteriorates, increasing  its riskiness  and,
hence, requiring higher yields to compensate bondholders for more risk: Korean Won exposure
clearly is an indirect exposure. The direct, negative impact on the yield spread might  now be
explained in terms of improved economic outlook and the high correlation of the Won with the
country rating. Alternatively, a weakening Won might lead to higher exports so that an economy
as energy dependent as  Korea's  would require more gas  and electricity which  decreases the
demand, i.e., direct breach of contract risk all other things being equal.
In Table 6, we replicate the simultaneous equation analysis for RGS and KORELES in
first differences. As  in the previous analysis (see Table 4) levels of the explanatory variables
perform better than their differences with the exception of the rating variable KRR. When the
Kepco yield spread equation is specified in levels we obtain results that, by and large, mirror the
results in Table 5. However, the insignificant coefficient on KORELES  in the  ARGS equation
indicates  that  the  model  is  misspecified.  Repeating  the  estimations  with
AKORELES  (specifications 3 and 4) reveals several new effects. First, changes in Kepco yield
spreads respond to Asian and Latin American debt markets while levels do not  (see Table  5).
Second, energy prices are marginally less significant in the AKORELES than the ARGS  equation
so that  direct  and  indirect impact are very  comparable.  Finally, the only  significant  Korean
variables are KOSPI and the rating index, both for changes in RGS and KORELES. As Korea's
economic prospects improve as measured by a higher stock price index, both Ras Gas and Kepco
credit spreads change by less.
In order to further investigate the insignificance of the oil price variable BRENT we next
compose it into three distinct bands: oil prices under USD  14, between USD  14 and  23, and
above  USD  23.  The  choice  of  these  bands  corresponds  to  the  contractual  provisions  and
economics of electricity generation from LNG. Below approximately USD  14 per barrel, price
support and debt service guarantees by Mobil to the bondholders will be triggered. Above USD
23, the electricity generation from LNG becomes uneconomical so that breach of contract risk
escalates at such prices all the more that the LNG fired power plants are Kepco's  marginal ones.
As  a  result,  we  split  the  oil  price's  logarithm  into  three  explanatory  variables  in  all  our
estimations:
A BRENT, = 6,  lIBENT,:514)BRENT, + g2  1{14<BENT,  <23}  BRENT, +  631 1235BENT,  }BRENT,
Table 7 summarizes the results for our four main specifications after substituting in for
BRENT  from  the preceding  expression.  The  oil prices  are  still  statistically  insignificant  in
determining  Ras Gas yield  spread levels  for the  contract related and  full set  of explanatory
variables  (specifications  1 and 2).  Investors  seem to  regard oil price  levels as  irrelevant for
contract default or renegotiation, debt service and firm risk. The picture changes for credit spread
changes where decomposed oil prices become statistically significant as compared to the non-
decomposed variable (Table 4, specification 8). The most plausible explanation revolves around
the absence of Korean variables which are highly collinear with oil prices. The simultaneous
equation estimations in Table 7 further confirm these and earlier results: oil prices affect Ras Gas
credit spreads and their changes mainly through their indirect effect on Kepco's credit quality.19
Markets apparently do not distinguish between different oil price levels in pricing Ras
Gas' credit risk. Given the intricate economics of LNG it  might simply be the case that investors
lack the information to make the link between different oil price levels and Ras Gas' prospects.
Alternatively, the high volatility of oil prices in the past decade might have induced the belief
that oil prices never stay long enough  in any of the three bands to trigger the corresponding
economic and financial consequences. In this case, the relative unimportance accorded to  oil
prices might reflect the market's  collective view that the revenue impact is only temporary and
that contracts are not renegotiated unless the oil price settles permanently way beyond one of the
trigger points.
7.  Conclusion
Much of current corporate finance theory draws upon the view that a firm is a nexus of
contract.  Nowhere  is  this  view  more  evident  than  in  project  finance  where  construction,
operating, output purchase and financial contracts form an interwoven web that determines the
project's  value and risk. In this paper we analyze how in the face of contractual incompleteness
risks are transmitted and allocated between the different contracts and investors. Of particular
importance  is  the relationship  between  off-take  and  financial  contracts  because the  former
effectively serves as security for the latter. Since such long-term supply contracts are necessarily
incomplete and subject to opportunistic behavior, one would expect that factors affecting the off-
take agreement impact a  project's  riskiness. Using  daily data  from the Ras  Gas project,  we
investigate the link between off-take contract and financial structure by relating Ras Gas bond
spreads to  credit  spreads of the major output buyer, the Korean  electricity monopoly Kepco,
emerging market returns and variables affecting the economic prospects of the parties. We find
evidence for risk-shifting in the sense that non-contractible risks arising from the 25 year sale
and purchase agreement determine the pricing and riskiness  of the Ras  Gas bonds. Ras  Gas
essentially  passes on  the  output contract  risk  to  its  investors  who,  in  consequence,  closely
identify the company with the prospects and riskiness of the ultimate buyer.
As predicted by the nexus of contract view of the firm, the market's  perception of the
output buyer's  (Kepco) credit quality is the most important variable for explaining bondholders'
attitudes to Ras Gas' riskiness. With the lack of a spot market for the output, Ras Gas needs the
long-term supply contract for fixed quantities, which generates 75% of the company's  revenue,
as the basis for its funding. Bondholders accordingly assess the financial prospects of Ras Gas in
terms of the output buyer's  credit quality as a proxy for contract default or renegotiation risk.
However, we also  find  evidence that bondholder  over-react to  movements  in  the off-taker's
credit spreads.
The second critical  contract variable, the  oil price to  which  the sales are indexed,  is
surprisingly insignificant. Markets seem to view price risk as secondary to counter-party (breach
of contract) risk. However, high oil prices adversely affect the financial position of Kepco so that
we  decompose the various  risks into their  direct  effects  on Ras  Gas credit  spreads and  the20
indirect ones via Kepco spreads in a simultaneous equation model. It emerges that oil prices are
an  indirect risk rather than a  direct one: when they rise they  essentially increase the overall
riskiness of Kepco through their adverse financial impact which is not off-set by the additional
revenue they represent for Ras Gas
Controlling for spill-overs from other segments of emerging debt markets highlights the
contagion  risks  stemming  from  the  Asian  and  Russian  financial  crises.  The  most  serious
contagion effect comes from the Russian financial crisis, which impacted emerging debt markets
more severely than the Asian  crisis.  Through  the lag structure, the analysis  reveals both  an
instantaneous and delayed reaction to European emerging debt markets (dominated by Russia)
while events in Middle Eastern and Latin American debt markets take 2 to 5 days to feed through
to  Ras Gas spreads.  The curious absence of  Asian emerging  debt markets as  risk  factors is
explained by the inclusion of variables related to the Korean economy. Changes in the common
credit rating of Korea, Kepco and Kogas (the intermediary), the Korean Stock Price index and
Kepco's  share price as well as the Won-USD exchange rate pick up all the Asian financial crisis
effects.
Since projects so closely conform to stylized models of the firm, we would argue that the
lessons drawn from this analysis are of wider applicability to the study of corporate finance. By
analyzing projects where one output buyer generates most of the revenue we can gain valuable
insights into the precise workings of the nexus of contract. This paper represents a first attempt at
opening up the black box of the contractual web and to empirically investigate how risks and
returns of one contractual relation impact others.  Our analysis shows that the design  of each
contractual arrangement is not independent as risk factors pertaining to one contract determine
the price and risk premium of the other. Despite heavy capitalization and partial guarantees by
the parent companies of Ras Gas, the off-take agreement essentially determines the riskiness of
its bonds. We interpret this as evidence for the nexus of contracts view of the firm in the presence
of  contractual incompleteness: investors bear all residual risks and price their financial claims
accordingly.REFERENCES
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Summary  statistics
Descriptive Statistics
All results based on nonmissing observations.
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Cases
RGS  3.15457597  1.76512011  1.14000000  8.95800000  724
RGS  [-11  3.15347514  1.76580229  1.14000000  8.95800000  724
LBRENT  2.79499119  .279653669  2.19722458  3.36867419  724
BRENT  17.0073066  4.72004282  9.00000000  29.0400000  724
KORELE  9.37895580  1.80951711  7.09000000  16.7000000  724
KORELES  3.58997099  2.26258625  1.01000000  10.9700000  724
LKEPCO  3.25205674  .347627996  2.55722731  3.91800508  724
LKRW  7.05355026  .185291648  6.73494831  7.58197445  724
KRW  1176.82124  216.996477  841.300000  1962.50000  724
LKOSPI  6.39619862  .361655049  5.63478960  6.96511812  724
KOSPI  637.435967  211.383129  280.000000  1059.04000  724
KRR  4.68922652  3.02389652  .000000000  10.0000000  724
LMEAR  .263418143E-03  .404848157E-02  -.261950747E-01  .201192051E-01  724
LASIAR  .192941156E-03  .805700969E-02  -.610478681E-01  .420264714E-01  724
LEURR  .916357139E-04  .692969809E-02  -.114747733  .247232517E-01  724
LLATR  .641730716E-03  .479112097E-02  -.418460416E-01  .262899561E-01  724
Correlation Matrix for Listed Variables
RGS  RGS[-1]  LBRENT  BRENT  KORELE  KORELES  LKEPCO  LKRW
RGS  1.00000  .99763  -.53166  -.47943  .71445  .79947  .06002  .51766
RGS[-1]  .99763  1.00000  -.53124  -.47826  .70356  .79071  .06935  .51464
LBRENT  -.53166  -.53124  1.00000  .98948  -.50880  -.62350  .42638  -.48591
BRENT  -.47943  -.47826  .98948  1.00000  -.48879  -.59834  .44880  -.46235
KORELE  .71445  .70356  -.50880  -.48879  1.00000  .97795  -.44896  .70817
KORELES  .79947  .79071  -.62350  -.59834  .97795  1.00000  -.41950  .74216
LKEPCO  .06002  .06935  .42638  .44880  -.44896  -.41950  1.00000  -.24101
LKRW  .51766  .51464  -.48591  -.46235  .70817  .74216  -.24101  1.00000
RGS  RGS(-1]  LBRENT  BRENT  KORELE  KORELES  LKEPCO  LKRW
KRW  .47006  .46687  -.47967  -.46269  .70423  .72941  -.28449  .99354
LKOSPI  -.36611  -.35708  .71442  .71717  -.72865  -.74218  .86010  -.48504
KOSPI  -.31670  -.30915  .74300  .75109  -.64733  -.67386  .87491  -.43038
KRR  .63763  .63648  -.48416  -.44050  .66987  .72687  -.02869  .93973
LMEAR  .02549  .03022  .04179  .04118  -.02219  -.02522  .06171  -.03496
LASIAR  .12995  .13299  -.06085  -.05374  .06662  .07565  .04467  .03038
LEURR  -.00788  .00275  .01079  .00552  -.01167  -.00493  .02205  .02743
LLATR  .04876  .05694  -.00955  -.00129  -.00721  .00291  .04240  -.00142
KRW  LKOSPI  KOSPI  KRR  LMEAR  LASIAR  LEURR  LLATR
KRW  1.00000  -.50266  -.45531  .90893  -.03469  .01651  .02937  -.00286
LKOSPI  -.50266  1.00000  .98591  -.35775  .05783  -.01695  .03677  .02413
KOSPI  -.45531  .98591  1.00000  -.29443  .05139  -.01328  .03490  .02035
KRR  .90893  -.35775  -.29443  1.00000  -.02877  .06910  .01607  .00015
LMEAR  -.03469  .05783  .05139  -.02877  1.00000  .09719  .24120  .32864
LASIAR  .01651  -.01695  -.01328  .06910  .09719  1.00000  .07889  .11365
LEURR  .02937  .03677  .03490  .01607  .24120  .07889  1.00000  .09531
LLATR  -.00286  .02413  .02035  .00015  .32864  .11365  .09531  1.0000025
Table 2: Contract  and Emerging  Market  Analysis
RGS, =fi,  + I  a_,RGS>, + AIIBRENT +  E  /32 ,  KORELES,_,  + /3KEPCO,  + J4KRW, + J5KOSPI, + / 6KRR,
OS'ISL  OS/SE
+ Z  ,-IMEA4l  +y 2,_,AS14_-  +Y3,  EUR;,  +74 ,ILAT I-1]+6,
where the dependent variable RGS is the spread of the Ras Gas bond over 10 year US Treasury yields, BRENT the
logarithm  of the Brent blend oil price index, KORELES  the spread of the 2013 7.75% Kepco global bond over 10
year US Treasury yields, KEPCO the logarithm of the Kepco stock price, KRW the logarithm of the Korean Won -
USD spot rate, KOSPI  the logarithm  of the Korea Composite  Stock  Price Index, KRR a rating index for Korea, and
MEA,  ASIA, EUR,  LA  T the continuously  compounded  daily returns  of the JP Morgan  regional  total return indices in
USD  for emerging  markets  in the Middle  East-Africa,  Asia, Europe  and Latin America.
Specification  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Dep. Variable  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  1.9684  -.1300  -.0980  0.01273  -.1132  .8682  .6125  .4158
.0004  .0374  .1011  0.1515  .0488  .1637  .0115  .0778
RGS(- 1)  .9755  .9819  0.99812  .9834  .9679  .9650  .9817
.0000  .0000  0.0000  0.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
BRENT  -.3427  .0424  .0309  .0368  -.0089  .0038  .0348
.0571  .0340  .1064  .0462  .7345  .8518  .0584
KORELES  .5972  .02496  .1558  .1499  .1631  .1609  .1523
.0000  .0000  .0000  0.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KORELES(-I)  -.1365  -.1312  -.1230  -.1213  -.1282
.0000  0.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KEPCO  .0704
l  ___________  __________  .00  16  _________0
KRW  -.1934  -.1248  -.0762





EUR  -2.13609  -2.0387  -2.0053  -1.9789  -1.9841
0.0007  .0005  .0005  .0006  .0006
LAT  -2.27699
.0129
LAT(-1)  -2.09425  -1.5725  -1.5412  -1.5594  -1.5663
0.0218  .0624  .0660  .0621  .0626
MEA(-2)  -3.09962  -2.7622  -2.8062  -2.8438  -2.8012
0.0040  .0058  .0048  .0042  .0051
EUR(-3)  -3.07837  -3.2586  -3.3701  -3.2883  -3.2260
0.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
LAT(-5)  -2.57983  -2.1537  -2.0545  -2.1006  -2.1405
0.0050  .0114  .0151  .0127  .0116
Obs.  724  724  724  719  719  719  719  719
Adj. R2 _.63995  .99558  0.99596  0.99569  .99631  .99636  .99638  0.99633
DW  d Stat.  .02340  1.90390  2.00086  1.89391  2.05283  2.05791  2.05229  2.0614926
Table 3: Unit Roots and Cointegration
Testing  for unit roots and co-integration  we appeal  to Dickey-Fuller,  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller,  and Augmented
Engle-Granger  tests of the form,  respectively,  where  in the AEG test  case the residuals  are drawn  from the corre-
sponding co-integration  equation:
Ay, =  8,  +  It-  )y,-, + 6,,  A£  a,  + (at - )_+  u,
where the dependent variabley  is either RGS, the spread of the Ras Gas bond over 10 year  US Treasury yields,  or
KORELES,  the spread of the 2013 7.75% Kepco global bond.  The (one-sided) simulated  asymptotic critical values
for the r statistic for unit root tests under the null hypothesis are drawn from the Davidson and McKinnon (1993).
F  Dependent  ARGS,  ARGS,  AKORELES,  AKORELES,  Residuals:  Residuals:
Variable  RGS  RGS
KORELES  BRENT
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
r -Value  r -Value  r -Value  r -Value  r -Value  r  -Value
Constant  .0097  .0099  .0277  .0318
RGS(-1)  -.0027  -.0028
-1.076  -1.126
DRGS(-1)  .0846
KORELES(- 1)  -.0072  -.0085
-1.700  -2.029
DKORELES(- 1)  .2079
E(-1)  -132  -.0041
-2.262  -1.212  _
DE(- 1)  .0671  .0940  |
Crit. value:  I%  -3.43  -3.43  -3.43  -3.43  -3.90  -390
Crit. value: 5%  -2.86  -286  -2.86  -2.86  -3.34-3.3
Crit. value: 10%  -2.57  -2.57  -2.57  -2.57  -3.04  -3.04
Crit. value: 97.5%  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  -0.30  -0.30
Obs.  724  723  724  723  723  723
Adj. R2 .00022  .00596  .00261  .04444  .00931  .00885
DWdStat.  1.83052  2.01473  1.58662  1.92602  1.98719  2.0131027
Table 4: Changes in Ras Gas Spreads
ARGS,  = A 0 + AiBRENT, +  ,  , 2_,KORELES,,  + /3,KEPCO,  + ,64KRW, + ,36KOSPI, +±f 6 AKRR,
+ E,',ME4,  ,ASIA  _,y 3 ,EUR,P + 3 ,LAT1,,]+£,
where the dependent  variable ARGS is the first difference  of the Ras Gas bond spreads over 10 year US Treasury
yields, BRENT the Brent blend oil price index in logarithms,  KORELES  the spread of the 2013 7.75% Kepco global
bond and DKORELES  its first difference, KEPCO  the Kepco stock price in logarithms, KRW the Korean Won -
USD spot rate in logarithms,  KOSPI the Korea Composite Stock Price Index in logarithms,  KRR a rating index for
Korea, and MEA, ASIA, EUR, LA  T the continuously  compounded  daily returns of the JP Morgan regional total re-
turn indices in USD for emerging markets  in the Middle East-Africa,  Asia, Europe and Latin America.
Specification  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Dep. Variable  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  -.1319  .0008  .0189  .3312  .1364  -.1448  .0048  .0626
.0283  .8438  .6575  .2437  .2534  .0121  .2475  .8187
BRENT  .0365  -.0064  .0560  .0617  .0423
.0594  .6701  .0336  .0058  .0233
DBRENT  -.0185  -.9211
.9073  .9524
KORELES  .1597  .1550  .1429  .1530  .1455
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KORELES(-I)  -.1512  -.1468  -.1386  -.1443  -.1326
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
DKORELES  .1565  .1566  .1499
.0000  .0000  .0000
KEPCO  -.0149  -.0659
.6858  .0290
KRW  -.0406  -.0506
.2438  .1261
KOSPI  -.0282  -.0506  .0730
.5983  .0118  .0642
DKRR  .0380  .0384
.0397  .0302
EUR  -2.0585  -2.0501  -2.057
.0005  .0006  .0005
LAT(-I)  -1.8165  -1.8228  -1.755
.0331  .0346  .0391
MEA(-2)  -3.1005  -3.0727  -3.058
.0022  .0027  .0025
EUR(-3)  -3.1628  -3.1450  -3.195
.0000  .0000  .0000
LAT(-5)  -2.4008  -2.4026  -2.317
.0052  .0057  .0069
Obs.  724  724  724  724  724  719  719  719
Adj.  R2 .12408  .10983  0.1100  .13066  .13514  .20389  .18877  .20901
DW  dStat.  1.98276  1.94776  1.9487  2.00345  2.00340  2.03588  1.99468  2.0578828
Table 5: Simultaneous  Equations:  Ras Gas Spread  Levels
RGS,  = ,8,  + la_,,RGS,,  + ,8  ,BREN7T + 62,KORELES, + 2Jj,  ME4 ,  + Y2,1ASI4.  ±+  y3-,EU  R,  + y4 ,1 1LAT  ,]+ -,
0!0!￿L  05l￿L
KORELES,  =  /A.2  +fl2 BRENT + 42  /, 2KORELES,, +)6 32KEPCO,  +6 42KRW +A4 KOSPI,  +  /3.AKRR  +e,2
where the dependent variable RGS is the spread of the Ras Gas bond over 10 year US Treasury  yields, BRENT the
Brent blend oil price index, KORELES  the yield on the 2013 7.75% Kepco global bond, KEPCO the Kepco stock
price in logarithms,  KRW the Korean Won - USD spot rate in logarithms,  KOSPI the Korea Composite  Stock Price
Index in logarithms,  KRR a rating index for Korea, and MEA, ASIA, EUR, LA  T the daily returns of the JP Morgan
regional total return indices in USD for emerging  markets in the Middle East-Africa,  Asia, Europe and Latin Amer-
ica. We use Maximum  Likelihood  estimation  (asymptotically  equivalent  to Generalized  Least Square).
Specification  1  2  3  4
Dep. Variable  RGS  KORELES  RGS  KORELES  RGS  KORELES  RGS  KORELES
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  -.0962  -.6018  -.1037  .3452  .5383  .6506  .5397  .6536
.1072  .2639  .0832  .5649  .0288  .2924  .0193  .2894
RGS(-  1)  .9785  .9782  .9653  .9642
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
BRENT  .0335  .1276  .0359  .1883  .0024  .1816  .1796
.0809  .0110  .0613  .0009  .9069  .0014  .0013
KORELES  .0206  .0210  .0370  .0373
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KORELES(-1)  .9586  .9446  .9469  .9469
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KEPCO  .2191  .0625  .2382  .0633  .2380
l==  ______  .0047  .0047  .0023  .0012  .0023
KRW  .2696  .2636  -.1090  .2195  -.1083  .2193
.0003  .0003  .0028  .0034  .0024  .0034
KOSPI  -.2354  -.5073  -.5145  -.5137
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
DKRR  .2431  .0717  .2898  .0695  .2899
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0001  .0000
EUR  -2.1776  -1.3301  -2.0705  -1.9705  -2.0013
.0003  .3363  .0004  .0006  .0005
ASIA(-  1)  -.9312  -1.0715  -.92728
.0754  .3682  .0605
MEA(-2)  -2.8146  .1324  -2.8355  -2.9679  -3.0781
.0070  .9554  .0045  .0025  .0017
EUR(-3)  -3.3677  -.0418  -3.4154  -3.4000  -3.4034
.0000  .9762  .0000  .0000  .0000
LAT(-5)  -2.2099  -.0261  -2.1757  -2.1589  -2.1215
.0127  .9897  .0105  .0096  .0111
Obs.  719  719  719  719  719  719  719  719
Log-Likelihd  554.8793  554.8793  576.4339  576.4339  591.7214  591.7214  589.9580  589.9580
DW  d Stat.  1.9353  1.5691  1.9411  1.7267  2.0017  1.7684  2.0025  1.768429
Table 6: Simultaneous Equations: Ras Gas Yield Spread Changes
ARGS, = ,B.+  ja,,RGS 1 , + &BRENT  +  21KORELES, + XIj  -,ME4,  + r2-1,ASI,  + y3 ,,EUR,  + r4,,LAT_,]  +  e,,
0<￿!￿L  O￿IrL
KORELES, = 602  + A 12BRENT  +  E62,_2,KORELES,_,  + A32 KEPCO,  + f6 4 2KRW, + /65 4KOSPI, + f 6 4KRP, +  6,2
o0J￿L
where the variables are as previously defined and we use Maximum  Likelihood estimation  (asymptotically  equiva-
lent  to Generalized  Least Square).  The last two specifications  are obviously  in first differences.
Specification  1  2  3  4
Dep. Variable  DRGS  KORELES  DRGS  KORELES  DRGS  DKORELES  DRGS  DKORELES
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  .2805  .7475  .1623  .6532  .2743  .2670  .2252  .2573
.3310  .2329  .1721  .2767  .0003  .1120  .0020  .1258
BRENT  .0670  .1839  .0670  .1897  .0551  .1103  .0482  .1023
.0122  .0015  .0024  .0009  .0106  .0201  .0213  .0340
KORELES  .0039  .0030
.3923  .2854
KORELES(-I)  .9469  .9449
.0000  .0000
DKORELES  .1393  .1320
.0000  .0000
KEPCO  .0056  .2585  .2522
.8805  .0014  .0010
KRW  -.0158  .2132  .2320
.6463  .0044  .0012
KOSPI  -.0599  -.5338  -.0556  -.5381  -.0669  -.0899  -.0555  -.0846
.2739  .0000  .0054  .0000  .0001  .0143  .0006  .0223
DKRR  .0809  .2934  .0802  .2895  .0388  .2918  .0422  .2957
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0344  .0000  .0166  .0000
EUR  -2.1165  -.9579  -1.9981  -1.9498
.0005  .4696  .0006  .0008
ASIA(-1)  -1.2024  -1.7498  -.94852  -.85582  -2.2242
.0227  .1273  .0593  .0902  .0555
LAT(-1)  -1.8331  -2.0736  -1.5452  -1.4995  -2.3931
.0380  .2803  .0671  .0773  .2193
MEA(-2)  -3.0974  -.6686  -2.9841  -2.9304
.0031  .7691  .0028  .0035
EUR(-3)  -3.0841  .5065  -3. 1667  -3.0908
.0000  .7072  .0000  .0000
LAT(-5)  -2.3687  -.7892  -2.3499  -2.3191
.0076  .9673  .0055  .0064
Obs.  719  719  719  719  724  724  719  719
Log-Likelihd  582.2974  582.2974  579.8411  579.8411  533.3478  533.3478  563.6408  563.6408
DW d Stat.  2.0046  1.7752  2.0007  1.7643  2.0007  1.7897  2.0423  1.802230
Table  7: Oil Price  Decomposition
,BRENT=  .31  I (BRENT,￿I4BRENT+52ll1 4<BRBLNT,2 3 lBRENT7+S 3 l {23BRENT, )BRENT
Having split the Brent blend oil price index into three different price ranges in accordance with contractual provi-
sions and economic  consequences  (all in logarithms) we estimate the preceding four models with the decomposed
oil prices replacing the previous BRENT  variable and report the most significant specifications  surviving after diag-
nostic  testing.
Specification  1  2  3  4  5  6
Dep. Variable  RGS  RGS  DRGS  DRGS  RGS  KORELES  DRGS  DKORELES
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  -.1873  .5167  -.2706  -.2674  .3961  .4297  .2437  .0437
.0776  .0636  .0103  .0080  .1613  .5299  .4274  .9487
RGS(-1)  .9832  .9665  .9661
.0000  .0000  .0000
BRENT<14  .0651  .0277  .0899  .0885  .0397  .2429  .1036  .1779
.1123  .4922  .0284  .0240  .3363  .0098  .0163  .0616
BRENT: 14-23  .0618  .0242  .0853  .0851  .0340  .2313  .1010  .1648
.0830  .4977  .0166  .0125  .3510  .0058  .0085  .0516
BRENT>23  .0540  .0196  .0722  .0717  .0285  .2239  .0914  .1538
.0915  .5399  .0245  .0193  .3834  .0035  .0090  .0463
KORELES  .1551  .1510  .1582  .1415  .0363
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KORELES(-1)  -.1360  -.1124  -.1487  -.1317  .9470
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
DKORELES  .1387
.0000
KEPCO  .0713  .0626  .2376  .0347  -.0141
.0015  .0050  .0025  .2459  .8307
KRW  -.1201  -.1017  .2243  .0035  -.0027
.0015  .0074  .0033  .9019  .9661
KOSPI  -.5077  -.1034  -.0696
.0000  .0066  .4081
DKRR  .0382  .0413  .0716  .2897  .0382  .2910
.0289  .0195  .0000  .0000  .0374  .0000
EUR  -1.9365  -2.0216  -1.9817
.0008  .0006  .0005
ASIA(-I)  -.92218  -1.0567  -.92898
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